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The transportation of hazardous materials keeps increasing across the United States 
due to the growing consumption of goods and rising need for manufactured materials. 
Furthermore, concerns are mounting over the safe surface transportation of hazardous 
materials. Highways and rails are the most common modes of transport for hazardous 
materials, although the risk posed from highway transport of hazardous materials may be 
higher due to the fact that highways are public while rails are mostly private. The 
majority of hazardous material cargo is carried on the highway network by trucks. Due to 
possible adverse effects on human and animal populations in the event of an accident 
involving hazardous materials, there is a need for the development of a highway route 
risk assessment tool that precisely represents transportation risks associated with 
hazardous cargos and to build a framework for designating a set of risky routes based on 
different factors.  
The research presented in this thesis explains a methodology to analyze the spatial 
patterns of truck accident data, discern potentially risky routes of truck traffic carrying 
  
hazardous materials, and estimate the impact area of an identified risky route by 
quantifying the human population affected in that area. Lancaster County in Nebraska 
was used as the study area and the hazardous material exposure from a theoretical truck-
involved accident was estimated. It was concluded that the developed procedures 
successfully identified vulnerable areas in terms of hazardous material transport and 
estimated the affected areas and human population. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Hazardous materials (hazmats) are substances that can adversely affect human health 
and the environment. They are classified as explosives, flammables, oxidizing substances, 
poisonous gases or radioactive materials (United Nations, 2001). However, in a broad 
sense, hazmats can be substances whose physical or chemical traits can harm living 
organisms including humans (ABAG, 1990). A modern society ceaselessly requires and 
generates hazmats, which require safe handling and transport. Thus, safe treatment of 
hazmats has been a serious concern of society. 
According to the US Department of Transportation (USDOT), more than half of the 
total hazmat tonnage (53.9%) was carried by trucks on the highways (US DOT, 2010). 
The release of hazmat from a roadway accident is a serious threat to those in the vicinity 
of the accident location. As circumstances require, evacuation plans may be implemented 
at the affected areas. Therefore, it is important to identify areas that may be vulnerable in 
terms of hazmat accidents. 
Identification of highways that may be susceptible to hazmat crashes is an important 
first step toward more informed planning for hazmat accidents. This research focused on 
developing procedures and a tool for identification of vulnerable highway segments and 
surrounding areas with respect to hazmat incidents. Identification of susceptible 
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highways and surrounding areas can help policymakers, engineers, and stakeholders with 
more informed decision-making and better planning for dealing with hazmat accidents.  
This research utilized several publically-available datasets and GIS-based data 
integration techniques. The basic premise was that each input datum had intrinsic 
characteristics that represented suitable or unsuitable degrees for the research purpose 
(Murphy, 2005). Diverse input datasets (roadway networks, wind information, hazmat 
facilities, fire stations, medical facilities, schools, and population data) were obtained 
from public sources. In addition, four years of traffic accident data were obtained from 
the Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) to identify accident-prone highway 
segments for truck traffic. Spatial analytical concepts were utilized to discern patterns 
among truck accidents. The spatial analysis revealed useful accident point patterns which 
were then used in the integration of all the datasets. Combining all the datasets together 
allowed identification of highway segments satisfying multiple selection criteria. That is, 
the most vulnerable highway segments in terms of all the hazmat risk-related criteria 
were identified. The hazmat modeling tool was used to portray release pattern in the air. 
This provided a general view of hazmat dispersion patterns and the affected areas by the 
dispersion shapes. 
This thesis presents a concise description of the specific issues investigated in this 
research in a problem statement section. The sections after the problem statement include 
the research area selection, research objectives, research organization, data collection, 
data analysis, and conclusions.  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
 A significant amount of hazmat flows through Nebraska using the highway system 
and presents varying levels of hazmat exposure to areas along the highways. Currently, 
there is no assessment of the risk associated with the flow of hazmat on different 
Nebraska highway segments, including estimation of vulnerable populations in case of 
hazmat accidents on highways. Also, research techniques using multiple criteria in 
conjunction with statistical approaches using historical accident data have not been fully 
utilized. Thus, an investigation of the development of a geographic information system 
(GIS) based tool for assessment of risk on different Nebraska highway segments utilizing 
multi-criteria analysis that takes into consideration historical truck accident data is 
warranted.  
1.3 Research Area Selection 
To develop and test a GIS-based risk assessment tool for identification of hazmat risk 
on different Nebraska highway segments, areas with high truck traffic were selected. An 
estimate of the annual vehicle miles traveled by trucks (AVMTT) in Nebraska was 
considered an indicator for research area selection. AVMTT can be calculated by 
multiplying the distance by the Average Annual Daily Truck Traffic (AADTT). AADTT 
was computed using the American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials (AASHTO) method. This method has three steps: 
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1) Average monthly days of the week (MADW) are computed. There are 84 values 
(12 months by 7 days). 
2) The values are then averaged to yield the seven average annual days of the week 
(AADW). 
3) These seven values (AADW) are then averaged to yield the AADT. 
To derive the statewide AVMTT for only hazmat trucks, the portion of hazmat trucks 
in the traffic stream was required and obtained using the steps below. 
1) The State of Nebraska was divided into 8 sections. 
2) Each section had four truck traffic observation sites and 12-hour observations 
were collected at each site to count non-hazmat as well as hazmat trucks by 
hazmat classifications. 
3) Roadways where the observation sites were located were categorized by different 
road groups. 
4) NDOR adjustment factors for each road group were applied to convert 12-hour 
truck traffic data into annual average daily truck traffic and annual average daily 
hazmat truck traffic counts. 
Lancaster County in Nebraska was selected as the research area because it had one of 
the highest numbers of AVMTT for hazmat trucks, and the second highest number of 
total AVMT. While Lincoln and Dawson Counties had higher AVMTT for hazmat trucks 
(Table 1), these two counties had lower numbers for total AVMT. Thus, it was 
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appropriate to choose Lancaster County as the research area for analysis. Table 1 shows 
the top ten AVMTT for hazmat trucks in Nebraska. 
Table 1: Top 10 AVMTT for hazmat trucks in Nebraska 
Rank County 
2010 Hazmat Truck AVMTT  
(millions) 
2010 Total AVMT 
(millions) 
1 Lincoln 8.56177 587.069 
2 Dawson 6.889472 420.179 
3 Lancaster 4.967357 2361.797 
4 Douglas 4.760417 4432.422 
5 Buffalo 6.000548 592.996 
6 Keith 3.351206 305.761 
7 Hall 4.722522 622.849 
8 Seward 3.371577 377.335 
9 York 3.341434 350.771 
10 Hamilton 3.998482 291.613 
 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The research objective was to develop a GIS-based multi-criteria tool for 
identification of risk-prone highway segments for hazmat-involved highway accidents. 
Due to limitation of resources, consideration of all roadways in Nebraska for potential 
hazmat vehicle accidents was not practical and therefore, only major highway segments 
in Lancaster County were taken into consideration. Additionally, this research focused on 
identifying affected areas and resident populations that may potentially be affected by 
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released hazmat from a highway accident. According to chemical concentration levels 
from the source point, different boundaries lines were set. These lines could be used for 
evacuation plans in case of a hazmat release accident. Unlike using a circular boundary 
line, the research introduced a modeling tool for hazmat release patterns to portray the 
footprints of hazmat dispersion more accurately.  
 
1.5 Research Plan 
The research plan consisted of four main tasks, which are explained in each chapter 
of the thesis. A brief summary of each task is presented in sections 1.5.1-1.5.4. 
1.5.1 Task 1: Literature Review 
A literature review was conducted to provide current trends and statistics on hazmat 
transportation and accidents. This review task identified a general description of hazmat, 
shipments, number of hazmat-related accidents, hazmat transportation risk, impact area 
modeling, and multi-criteria analysis for hazmat transportation. The literature review 
section provides related research with respect to hazmat transportation, related problems, 
identifies the limit of current studies, and justifies this research. 
1.5.2 Task 2: Data Collection 
Several datasets were retrieved from diverse sources for multi-criteria analysis. Most 
data were obtained from official government websites free of cost. The collected data 
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included roadway network data; wind information; locations of hazmat facilities, fire 
stations, medical facilities and schools; four year period vehicle accident data; and 
population data in Lancaster County. Nebraska truck accident data were obtained from 
NDOR. Chapter 3 presents data collection details. 
1.5.3 Task 3: Data Analysis 
As part of this research three data analyses were conducted in GIS: a truck accident 
data analysis, a multi-criteria analysis, and an impact assessment analysis. The historical 
accident data were analyzed to be utilized in the multi-criteria analysis. Microsoft Excel 
software was used to extract truck-involved accidents from the accident data. Next, 
different criteria or layers were posed in a GIS platform for integration. The cell-based 
raster analytical concept was used to meet the different criteria. Finally, an impact 
assessment analysis was implemented to quantify the impact areas and population. 
1.5.4 Task 4: Conclusions  
This task consisted of drawing conclusions based on the results of each analysis and 
discusses the implications. Also, future research topics related to the studies in this thesis 
are presented.  
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1.6. Thesis Organization 
Following this chapter is a chapter on literature review that presents published 
literature relevant to this research, including a general description of hazardous materials, 
hazmat shipments, hazmat transportation accidents, hazmat transportation risk, impact 
area modeling, and multi-criteria analysis for hazmats. 
Chapter 3 presents data collection details such as where and how the data were 
collected, including explanations of each datum and their relevance to the research 
objectives. Chapter 4 presents the data analysis in which some of data were utilized 
directly while others, such as truck accident data, were analyzed with spatial analytical 
techniques to create more meaningful datasets. There are three main analysis parts in this 
chapter. They include truck accident data analysis, multi-criteria analysis, and impact 
analysis. A truck accident data analysis was conducted to create an accident density raster 
map, which was one of the inputs to multi-criteria analysis. In the multi-criteria analysis, 
all the inputs collected from different sources and the results of an accident data analysis 
were integrated to determine areas where all the criteria were met. The impact analysis 
showed the procedure to get both visual illustrations of impact and the quantification of 
the impact area.  
Chapter 5 presents the research conclusions that are based on information gained 
from the data analysis section. The chapter also includes information on the limitations 
and challenges of this research to adduce future directions of related studies. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 General Descriptions of Hazardous Materials 
The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) defined a hazardous material 
(hazmat) as “a harmful substance that can cause injury, death or serious illness, or put a 
substantial threat to the human population or the environment due to its chemical, 
physical or infectious attributes” (ABAG, 1990). The United Nations (2001) classified 
hazardous materials into nine different hazmat classes, using their physical, chemical, and 
nuclear properties. They were: explosives and pyrotechnics; gasses; flammable and 
combustible liquids; flammable, combustible, and dangerous-when-wet solids; oxidizers 
and organic peroxides; poisonous and infectious materials; radioactive materials; 
corrosive materials (acidic or basic); and miscellaneous dangerous goods, such as 
hazardous wastes. The USDOT used the same classifications for their Commodity Flow 
Survey (CFS). Table 2 shows the classification used for the survey. However, as defined 
by ABAG, hazmat can be any substance whose physical or chemical traits can harm 
living organisms, including humans. The United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(USEPA) and the California Department of Toxic Substance Control (DTSC) have been 
updating the list of classifications. 
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Table 2 USDOT Hazardous Material Classes 
Class Properties of Hazardous Materials 
1 Explosives 
2 Gases 
3 Flammable and combustible liquids 
4 Flammable solids 
5 Oxidizers and Organic Peroxides 
6 Toxic (Poisonous) Materials and Infectious Substances 
7 Radioactive Materials 
8 Corrosive Materials 
9 Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods 
 
2.2 Hazardous Material Shipments 
There were approximately 500,000 daily hazmat shipments reported in the US 
(Dungun, 1991). The Office of Hazardous Materials Safety (OHMS, 1998), or the 
affiliated organization Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA), which was created within the USDOT in 2004, estimates that there were more 
than 800,000 hazmat shipments per day in the US. According to OHMS, about 43% of 
total hazmat tonnage is transported by truck and approximately 94% of the total number 
of hazmat shipments were made by trucks while air, rail, and water transportation 
accounted for 5.3%, 0.53%, and 0.04% respectively (OHMS, 1998). Pipelines accounted 
for only 0.11% of the total hazmat trips.  
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Dependence on trucks for hazmat transportation increased in 2002 and 2007 
compared to 1998 in terms of the percentage of tons shipped. A Commodity Flow Survey 
(CFS) conducted by USDOT revealed that 52.9% and 53.9% of total hazmat tonnage was 
carried by trucks, followed by pipelines (30.2% and 28.2%) in 2002 and 2007 
respectively shown in Table 3 (USDOT, 2010).  Even though the percentage changed 
within narrow limits between 2002 and 2007, large amounts of hazardous materials were 
mainly transported by trucks using the highway system.  
Table 3 Hazardous Material Shipment Characteristics by Mode of Transportation: 
2007 and 2002 
Source: USDOT, 2010 
Mode of 
transportation 
Tons 
(thousands) 
Percentage of Tons 
2007 2002 2007 2002 
Truck        1,202,825         1,159,514  53.9% 52.9% 
Rail           129,743            109,369  5.8% 5.0% 
Water           149,794            228,197  6.7% 10.4% 
Pipeline           628,905            661,390  28.2% 30.2% 
Multiple modes           111,022              18,745  5.0% 0.9% 
Other and unknown 
modes 
             8,844              14,304  0.4% 0.6% 
Total        2,231,133         2,191,519  100.0% 100.0% 
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2.3 Hazardous Material Transportation Accidents 
Erkut et al. (2007) argued that even though a hazmat incident was a rare event, the 
potential consequences of such an incident were high. The USDOT (2013) reported that 
there were 15,774 incidents involving hazmat transportation in 2013, of which 26.5% 
were during the transit phase and it was noticeable that damages in the transit phase 
accounted for 94.6% of the total damages in 2013. That is, en-route damage was the 
largest portion, representing $67.06 million. Table 4 shows the 2013 hazmat incident 
summary by transportation phase. 
Table 4: U.S. Hazmat Incident Summary by Transportation Phase in 2013 
Source: PHMSA, 2014 
Transportation  
Phase 
Total 
Incidents 
Total number 
of 
Hospitalized 
Persons 
Total number of 
Non-
Hospitalized 
Persons 
Total 
Fatalities 
Total 
Damages 
In transit 4,184 11 37 9 $ 67,056,517 
In transit storage 483 8 0 0 $ 562,306 
Loading 3,350 3 22 1 $ 2,836,118 
Unloading 7,757 5 68 0 $ 454,873 
Total 15,774 27 127 10 $ 70,909,814 
 
PHMSA also provided hazmat accident information from the Incident Reports 
Database. The database contained all reported hazmat-related accidents since 2000, when 
such record-keeping started. Since 2000, there were 246,814 hazmat accidents. Figure 1 
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shows the hazmat accident classification from 2000 to 2014. It is noticeable that 
flammable-combustible liquids and corrosive materials accounted for the major portion 
of hazmat accidents during the period. 
 
Figure 1 Hazmat Accidents by Class (PHMSA, 2014) 
Source: https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/ 
 
 
2.4 Hazmat Transportation Risk 
Hazmat transportation risk is distinguishable from normal transportation accident risk 
since it may cause serious consequences to surrounding communities. Erukt et al. (2007) 
maintained that the main factor that distinguished hazmat transportation issues from other 
Flammable and 
combustible 
liquids 
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materials  
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Toxic materials  
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2% 
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transportation problems was the risk. List et al. (1991) used the following equation to 
calculate the total risk from hazmat movement on a highway link:  
𝑅𝑙 = 𝑆𝑙 × 𝑃𝑙 × 𝑁𝑙 
Where, 
𝑅𝑙 = the total risk from hazmat movement on link 𝑙, 
𝑆𝑙 = the number of shipments on link 𝑙, 
𝑃𝑙 = the probability of a hazmat release accident for a single shipment on link 𝑙, and 
𝑁𝑙 = the total number of persons who will be affected by a release accident on link 𝑙. 
Alp (1995) defined hazmat transportation risk as the measure of the probability and 
severity of damages to exposed receptors with respect to the hazmat-related 
transportation accidents. The exposed receptor could be anything such as a person, the 
environment, or properties near an accident spot (Erukt et al., 2007). That is, anything 
whose ability or function can be deteriorated by hazmat transportation release accidents 
was considered for calculation of hazmat transportation risk. In terms of consequences, 
Erukt el al. (2007) classified four different categories: human-related effects, including 
death, injury, or long-term effects of the hazmat exposure; property damages; 
environmental effects, including animals and plants; and socio-economic losses due to 
evacuation and blockage of affected roadway segments. 
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2.5 Impact Area Modeling 
There is significant literature that discusses modeling of impact areas by hazardous 
materials. Erkut et al. (2007) explained that the negative consequences in terms of hazmat 
transportation accidents are a function of the impact area and the affected population, 
property, and environmental resources. They maintained that the shape and the size of the 
hazmat impact area can be determined by hazmat types, topology, weather, and wind 
direction and speed. 
To estimate the impact area, different shapes and methods were used. Batta and Chiu 
(1988) and ReVelle et al. (1991) suggest a method to estimate the affected area by 
drawing a band of fixed width around each link and using the number of persons living 
within this band as the link consequence. For their approach, there was an assumption 
that all people living within the band would experience the same impact from the 
accident and people outside of the band would not be impacted. Erkut and Verter (1998) 
and Kara et al. (2003) used a “danger circle” centered on the hazmat accident point and 
calculated the affected areas within the “danger circle.” The radius of the circle was 
determined by the type of hazmat. Rectangles were also considered to model hazmat 
transportation impact area (ALK Associates, 1994). The “danger circle” or the 
rectangular model did not consider wind direction, resulting in a constant distance from 
the accident points. To model the impact of wind, the Gaussian plume model (GPM) was 
popularly utilized for impact areas due to its reliable reflection of airborne hazmat 
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accidents (Patel and Horowitz, 1994; Chakraborty and Armstrong, 1995; Zhang et al., 
2000). Figure 2 shows the shape of each described model. 
 
Figure 2 Impact Area Modeling Types around the Route Segments 
 
 
To model an airborne hazmat such as chlorine and ammonia, many researchers opted 
for GPM (Hanna et al., 1993; Patel and Horowitz, 1994; Chang et al., 1997; Zhang et al., 
2000; Puliafito et al., 2003). The basic equation for GPM is: 
𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) =
𝑄
2𝜋𝑢𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑧
exp ( 
−𝑦2
2𝜎𝑦2
) {exp (
−(𝑧 − ℎ)2
2𝜎𝑧2
) + exp (
−(𝑧 + ℎ)2
2𝜎𝑧2
)  }  
Where: 
𝐶 =the concentration of the emission, 
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Q = the quantity of the emission,  
u = the wind speed,  
h = the height of the source above ground level,  
𝜎𝑦 and 𝜎𝑧 = the standard deviations of a statistically normal plume in the lateral and 
vertical dimensions.  
The model considers dispersion in all three dimensions (x, y and z), but Erkut et al. 
(2006) maintained that the model could be simplified for hazmat dispersion from traffic 
accidents. Since the source of hazmat is on the ground, the z value, or the height of the 
source, is zero. This creates a new simplified equation as follows: 
𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) = 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦) =
𝑄
𝜋𝑢𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑧
exp ( 
−𝑦2
2𝜎𝑦2
) 
Erukt et al. (2007) pointed out several assumptions under the Gaussian Plume model:  
(1) The traits of airborne contaminants were kept during dispersion, 
(2) The topology was assumed flat, 
(3) The released gas was carried only by the air, and not absorbed by soil or plants, 
(4) The wind was blowing at a constant speed and in the same direction, and  
(5) The spillage rate was constant. 
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The authors indicated that these limiting assumptions might make the model 
impractical, resulting in inaccurate results. For example, if a hazmat release accident 
occurred in a geographically hilly area, the real release pattern of hazmat will be different 
from the created plume model. 
 
2.6 Multi-criteria Analysis for Hazmat Transportation 
Multiple-criteria analysis (MCA) originates from operations research, which 
considers diverse criteria to determine the optimal decision. MCA has been popular for 
making more informed decisions. MCA can be a useful approach for a hazmat 
transportation routing analysis since many different factors affect the risk of a hazmat 
release accident on highways. By considering different criteria together, it is possible to 
identify high-risk hazmat transportation routes. 
Lepofsky and Abkowitz (1993) conducted multi-criteria analysis, calculating the 
impact of hazmat transportation. They discussed possible Geographic Information 
Systems for Transportation (GIST) techniques for analysis of hazmat transportation and 
hazmat incident management by using different routing criteria such as distance, travel 
time, population exposure, and so on. They applied the techniques in several case studies 
in California to demonstrate the feasibility of the technique, and indicated the importance 
of weights on different criteria, since using different weights often give different results. 
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Panwhar et al. (2000) presented a multi-criteria risk assessment system for hazmat 
transportation based on a GIS. They developed the system to determine the optimized 
route that minimizes hazmat transportation risk. In the system, the optimized route did 
not necessarily have the best score for all the criteria because the route with the best 
averaged score was chosen.  
Leonelli et al. (2000) considered MCA routing models to select less dangerous routes 
for hazmat transportation. In the research, they analyzed an optimization problem 
between vehicle operating costs and risk-related costs. If routes were selected to 
minimize hazmat accident risks only, the significantly longer routes that avoid all the 
vulnerable areas could be determined as the best hazmat transportation routing model. 
They argued that these senselessly long routes were feasible without taking into account 
appropriate vehicle operating costs. This indicated that multiple criteria were required for 
analysis. They also explained that diverse weights could be added based on various 
objectives and that the weights should mirror the relative importance of each criterion.  
Van Raemdonck et al. (2013) argued that an allocation of weights to criteria approach 
causes a problem of subjective weight assignment that may produce varying results. In 
addition, Clark and Besterfield-Sacre (2009) maintained that previous studies using the 
multi-criteria analysis did not pay much attention to the statistical methods in which 
historical accident data are dealt. Abkowitz and Cheng (1988) also conclude that results 
may be more accurate if more quantitatively collected historical data were used in 
analyses. 
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3 DATA COLLECTION 
Eight possible different datasets of Lancaster County with respect to hazardous 
material transportation were used in the analysis. These were the roadway network, wind 
speed map, location information of fire stations, medical facilities, school locations, 
hazmat facilities, 2008 to 2011 accident data, and 2010 population data for Lancaster 
County. Each dataset is explained in detail in sections 3.1 to 3.6. 
3.1 Roadway Network in Lancaster County 
The roadway network information was essential to identification of risky hazmat 
transportation routes. The National Highway Planning Network (NHPN) version 11.09 
for Nebraska was used in this research. It is a 1:100,000 scale geospatial network 
database, and contains information on the National Highway System (NHS). The network 
system includes all principal arterials and rural minor arterials with respect to highway 
functional classes. Since the risk of major truck traffic carrying hazmat is higher on those 
high mobility-oriented roads, the arterials with different Annual Average Daily Traffic 
(AADT) in Lancaster County were classified and analyzed for different levels of risk. 
Figure 3 shows the arterials with different classes of AADT.  
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Figure 3 Three Different AADT Groups in Lancaster County 
 
3.2 Wind Information  
Wind speed and direction are an important consideration in the analysis of diffusion 
patterns of hazmat releases. If an area has higher wind speed, the risks of any hazmat 
released may be more significant since the rapid spread enlarges affected areas, on the 
other hand greater wind speed may help with the dispersal of any hazmat substance. The 
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US Department of Energy provides information on regional wind. Table 5 shows the 
classification and corresponding speeds at the elevation of 164.04 feet (50 meters). 
Table 5: Wind Power Class 
Wind power class 
Resource 
potential 
Wind speed at 50 m 
elevation (m/s) 
Wind speed at 164.04 ft 
elevation (ft/s) 
1 Poor 0.0 - 5.7 0.0 – 18.7 
2 Marginal 5.8 - 6.5 18.8 – 21.3 
3 Fair 6.6 - 7.2 21.4 – 23.6 
4 Good 7.3 - 7.8 23.7 – 25.6 
5 Excellent 7.9 - 8.2 25.7 – 26.9 
6 Outstanding 8.3 - 9.0 27.0 – 29.5 
7 Superb > 9.1 > 29.6 
 
Lancaster County only has four wind classes, which are shown in Figure 4. The 
prevailing wind speeds in Lancaster County range from 18.7 ft/s to 25.6 ft/s. It is notable 
that some regions in the south part of Lancaster County have relatively high wind speeds, 
which implies that any hazmat release may spread quickly. However, the areas showing 
strong wind have lower population density. Most of the areas in Lancaster County belong 
to category 2 Marginal (18.8 – 21.3 ft/s) and 3 Fair (21.4 – 23.6 ft/s) wind speeds.  
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Figure 4 Wind Classes in Lancaster County 
 
3.3 Hazmat Facilities in Lancaster County 
The location of major hazmat facilities is an important factor to consider as hazmat 
accidents could occur at these facilities during loading and unloading. The US EPA has 
the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program, which provides information on the hazmat 
facility names, addresses, coordinates, chemical types, and quantities, etc. The 2010 data 
for Nebraska were downloaded from the inventory and used to locate hazmat facilities in 
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Lancaster County. The total 21 hazmat facilities in Lancaster County were geocoded 
using the coordinates of each facility. The detailed TRI geocoding information for 
hazmat facilities is provided in Appendix A. Figure 5 shows the locations of those 
hazmat facilities in Lancaster County. Areas around these facilities were deemed more 
dangerous due to the possibility of incidents during loading and unloading of hazmat. 
 
Figure 5 Hazmat Facilities in Lancaster County 
 
Across the county, facilities storing different hazmats were mostly located along 
major arterials and avoided densely populated areas. Figure 6 shows the locations of 
hazmat facilities and housing units in the center of Lancaster County. It is notable that 
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none of the hazmat facilities are included in areas that have more than 180 housing units.  
However, some areas near the hazmat facilities have moderate number of housing units. 
 
 
Figure 6 Locations of Hazmat Facilities and Housing Units 
 
3.4 Fire Stations, Medical Facilities and Schools in Lancaster County 
For risk analysis, the locations of fire stations, medical facilities, and schools were 
taken into consideration. It was assumed that areas closer to fire stations would have 
lower risk than areas farther from the stations because of greater response time to 
hazardous materials incidents. An area in close proximity to a fire station will have a 
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lower hazmat risk due to quicker response. Similarly, nearby medical facilities could 
reduce the consequences of harmful spilled contaminants due to quick treatment for 
patients. However, areas close to schools were regarded to be riskier since people are 
more concentrated in schools and young students are more likely to be vulnerable to the 
harmful substances than adults. Figure 7 shows the locations of fire stations, medical 
facilities, and schools in Lancaster County. 
 
Figure 7 Locations of Fire Stations, medical facilities and Schools in Lancaster County 
(Fire Stations in circles, medical facilities in triangles and schools in rectangles) 
3.5 Heavy Vehicle Accident Data  
Analyzing historic vehicle accident data provides information about where the 
potential accidents could occur. If frequent accidents have occurred in a certain area then 
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it needs to be investigated for potential future accidents. For this research, accident data 
were utilized to identify risk-prone roadway segments for hazmat truck accidents. The 
dataset was obtained from NDOR and covered a four-year (2008 to 2011) period. The 
data included information on the geographic coordinates of each accident, severity levels, 
time of day, weather conditions, etc. Usually, vehicles transporting hazmat are large-
sized trucks. Therefore, only accidents involving trucks were considered in the 
assessment of potential for hazmat accidents. During the four-year period, there were 
7,748 accidents involving trucks in Nebraska of which 947 were reported in Lancaster 
County. The data were used to predict sites where accident risk was high by analyzing a 
point density map. Figure 8 shows the 947 truck accident points in Lancaster County. 
 
Figure 8 Truck Accident Points in Lancaster County (2008-2011) 
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3.6 Lancaster County Population Data 
It was noted that hazmat accidents in populated areas will do more harm compared to 
less populated areas. This is because the total risk from hazmat movement is the product 
of the number of shipments, the probability of a release accident for a single shipment, 
and the total number of persons that may be affected by a release accident. The 
population data were obtained in the TIGER/Line Shapefiles from the United States 
Census Bureau. This dataset includes the population and housing unit count by census 
block from the 2010 Census for 50 states and the District of Columbia. Figure 9 shows 
the 2010 housing units in Lancaster County, Nebraska. The red colors represent a higher 
number of housing units and have higher risk of damage in case of hazmat accidents. 
 
Figure 9 Housing Units in Lancaster County (2010) 
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4 DATA ANALYSIS  
The data analysis followed the three steps shown in Figure 10. First, a spatial 
statistical analysis for historical truck accident data was undertaken. Accident data during 
the four-year period were used to find their spatial distribution in the study area, and an 
accident density map was obtained. Second, a GIS technique called suitability analysis 
was conducted to solve a multi-criteria problem. During this step, the geographic areas 
that satisfied different criteria were identified and considered as vulnerable areas. The 
identified areas were used to designate risk-prone routes in the study area. Third, the 
Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) model was used to estimate the 
affected area and population by a potential hazmat truck accident on the identified 
vulnerable routes.  
 
Figure 10 Steps in Data Analysis 
Step 1 
•Analyze the Accident Data        
(Spatial Statistical Analysis) 
Step 2 
• Identify the Vulnerable Routes 
(Multi-criteria Analysis) 
Step 3 
•Estimate the Affected Areas     
(ALOHA Model) 
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4.1 Truck Accident Data Analysis 
4.1.1 General description 
Truck accident data were utilized to predict routes with potential for hazmat 
accidents in the study area. Analyzing spatial patterns of accidents provides information 
on where the accidents could be concentrated. If the distribution of accident points in a 
certain area is significantly different from the pattern of the same number of randomly 
distributed points, the point pattern may suggest clusters or dispersions, and clusters of 
accidents could indicate risk-prone roadway segments for truck traffic.  
In traditional spatial statistical approaches for a planar area, the null hypothesis is 
complete spatial randomness (CSR). Its rejection represents that the points are either 
clustered or regularly dispersed. However, since traffic accidents are concentrated along 
roads, the traditional CSR hypothesis is invariably rejected. Therefore, a simple cluster 
analysis is not practical with respect to traffic accident point data. However, accident 
points can be dealt with their properties, or attribute values. In terms of the accident data 
obtained from NDOR, each accident contained information on injury severity levels. This 
severity level is measured on six different levels. Table 6 represents the description of 
each severity level. For instance, if high severity accidents are found to be clustered in a 
certain area, the location would be considered as a high severity accident-prone area. If 
low severity accidents are gathered together in another area, that can be regarded as a low 
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severity accident-prone area. Using the attribute values of accidents, clusters having high 
or low severity accidents were identified. 
In the original accident data, severity levels were classified as FATAL, INJ-A, INJ-
B, INJ-C, PDO and N-R (not reported). For each severity level, corresponding values in 
numbers were added because the spatial analysis uses attribute values in numbers. That 
is, FATAL accidents have the highest number (6), and the number goes down as the 
severity level reduces. With these attribute values, the spatial analytic concepts of Global 
Moran’s I, Getis-Ord Gi* statistic, and Kernel Density were used to discover where the 
high or low severity accidents were clustered and how dense those accidents points were 
in the study area.  
Table 6 Accident Severity Levels 
Type Description Value 
FATAL Fatal crashes 6 
INJ-A Severe injury crashes 5 
INJ-B Moderate injury crashes 4 
INJ-C Minor injury crashes 3 
PDO 
Property damage only crashes 
(Damage crashes of $1,000 or more) 
2 
N-R 
Non-reportable 
(Damages less than $1,000) 
1 
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4.1.2 Global Moran’s I 
Global Moran’s I is a spatial autocorrelation tool to identify if the spatial pattern of 
attribute values in the study area is clustered, dispersed, or random (Moran, 1950). As the 
name suggests, Global Moran’s I searches for spatial patterns of feature values for the 
whole study area. It is unable to pinpoint where the high or low attribute values are 
clustered locally. Instead, it only provides whether the whole study area is clustered with 
high attribute values and/or low attribute values with statistical significance. The 
technique produces the Moran’s I Index value to show the results. Also, z-score and p-
value are determined to show the significance of the calculated index. The index and the 
z-score can be computed by the following equations: 
 I =
𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
×
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑗(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)(𝑥𝑗 − ?̅?)
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑧 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
𝐼 − 𝐸[𝐼]
√𝑉[𝐼]
 
Where, xi is an attribute value of a target point, xj is an attribute value of a 
neighboring point, wij is the spatial weight between point i and j for example, as wij = 1 
if i ≠ j and the two points are within the specified distance, and by wij = 0 otherwise, n 
is the total number of points.  
The expected value and the variance of Moran’s I are given in the following 
equations: 
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𝐸[𝐼] = −1/(𝑛 − 1) 
𝑉[𝐼] = 𝐸[𝐼2] − 𝐸[𝐼]2 
The ranges of Moran’s I index are between -1 and 1. A positive value represents 
distribution of high and/or low attribute values that are clustered in proximity, while 
negative value indicates the distribution of high and low attribute values that are 
dispersed compared to the random distribution. A zero value implies no spatial 
autocorrelation amongst the points, representing the distribution of attribute values are 
randomly distributed. 
When it comes to statistical hypothesis in Moran’s I, the null hypothesis is that the 
attribute values for each point are randomly distributed among the points without 
changing the location of the points. If the p-value is not statistically significant, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, concluding that the study area has randomly distributed 
attribute values. If the p-value is statistically significant, the sign of the z-score 
determines whether high and low attribute values are clustered or dispersed. A positive z-
score means the study area has high and/or low attribute values aggregated, while a 
negative z-score represents that high and/or low attribute values are dispersed. 
In this research, straight line distances among accident points were considered to 
define clusters, and a fixed distance band was used for the spatial conceptualization. To 
be specific, if a certain fixed distance is set, GIS calculates the target point with its 
neighboring points within that threshold distance. The points beyond the distance are 
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excluded from calculations. The Global Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation tool was used to 
identify proper critical distance to calculate neighboring points used in the hot spot 
analysis. That is, it helps discern a critical distance, which makes the spatial 
autocorrelation stronger. This is because using different critical distances produces 
different z-scores and if an analysis with a certain distance produced the peaked z-score 
in the series of Global Moran’s I analysis, the selected distance is the search scale radius, 
which makes the spatial clustering the strongest. 
By changing the distance, multiple trials of Moran’s I were conducted using an 
incremental spatial autocorrelation tool. This measures how the degree of spatial 
autocorrelation changes as the distance changes using Global Moran’s I, and the degree 
can be measured by z-score. The initial distance was set to 328.08 feet (100 meters), and 
the increment was 164.04 feet (50 meters). A total of 30 distance bands (100m ~ 1550m) 
were tested to find the peaked z-score. Figure 11 shows the z-scores at different distances 
for truck accident points in Lancaster County. The detailed information about the result 
of Incremental Spatial Autocorrelation in 30 different distance bands is provided in 
Appendix B. The peaked z-score is highest at the distance of 1,804.46 feet (550 meters) 
for the critical distance. The z-score and p-value were 2.804 and 0.00504 respectively. 
Thus 1804.46 feet (550 meters) was used in the hot spot analysis for the search radius to 
define neighboring points. 
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Figure 11 Spatial Autocorrelation by Distance for Truck Accidents in Lancaster County 
 
4.1.3 Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi* Statistic) 
The hot spot analysis was used to find clusters with high or low feature values with 
statistical significance. Hot spots refer to clusters with high attribute values while a cold 
spot represents clusters consisting of low feature values. For each target point, the 
analysis searches adjacent points within the critical distance band. Afterwards, the 
analysis determines whether the target point is surrounded by high or low feature values 
with statistically significant levels. Instead of global spatial statistics such as Global 
Moran’s I, the hot spot analysis uses the Getis-Ord Gi* Statistic, which is a local 
variation measure of spatial clustering. That is, the analysis can help pinpoint those 
clusters. If a target point containing a high attribute value is surrounded by enough 
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neighboring points with high attribute values, the point is determined to be a statistically 
significant hot spot. In this research, a hot spot analysis was conducted to find where the 
high and low severity accidents were clustered. The clustering locations could be 
considered high or low severity accident-prone areas. 
The calculation of the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic is given as the following equation. The 
Gi* statistic itself is the z-score. If the z-score is not statistically significant, the target 
point is surrounded by high and low feature values together, resulting in no clustering of 
high or low feature values. When the z-score of a target point is statistically significant, it 
can either be clusters of high or low values. A positive z-score means high feature values 
are clustered (hot spots), while a negative z-score represents low feature values clusters 
(cold spots). In terms of the size of z-score, a larger z-score indicates a higher degree of 
clustering while a smaller z-score implies a lower degree of clustering. 
𝐺𝑖∗ =
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗 − (
∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛 ) ×
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑗=1
√
∑ 𝑥𝑗
2𝑛
𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛 ×
√𝑛 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
2 − (∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 )
2𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛 − 1
 
Where, xi is an attribute value of a target point, xj is an attribute value of a 
neighboring point, wij is the spatial weight between point i and j for example, as wij = 1 
if i ≠ j and the two points are within the specified distance, and by wij = 0 otherwise, n 
is the total number of points.  
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Hot spot analysis was conducted in GIS with the truck accident data. The specified 
critical distance band was set at 550m (1804.46 feet), which made spatial autocorrelation 
stronger. That is, the spatial weight (wij) was equal to zero beyond that distance since the 
fixed distance method was chosen in the analysis. Figure 12 shows the result of Hot Spot 
Analysis. 
 
Figure 12 Hot Spot Analysis for Truck Accidents in Lancaster County 
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The result of the hot spot analysis showed the points with statistically significant 
levels. In the downtown area of Lancaster County substantial cold spots, or clusters of 
low severity accidents, were detected. Figure 13 shows the clusters of low severity 
accidents near the downtown area. Most of the cold spots were at the intersection of West 
O Street and 9th Street. Even though many accidents occurred at that location, the 
severity level for the cluster was somewhat mild since the area has a complex road 
network, making traffic move slowly. Several hot spot clusters were identified across the 
study area. Hot spots tended to be located on high speed roadways such as interstate 
highways or major highways. Also, they were usually near intersecting or merging points 
of more than two roadway segments.  
 
Figure 13 Clustering of Low Severity Accidents 
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4.1.4 Accident Density 
 
To consider the clustered truck accident points objectively in the analysis, a density 
map for each point was produced. In GIS, the Kernel Density tool estimates a magnitude 
per unit area from accident points using the Kernel function. This creates smooth contour 
lines from the center in which a point exists to the reference location. With other points, 
the density map can be created with smoothly curved surfaces for each truck accident 
point. 
Instead of applying accidents equally to get an accident density map, a different 
weight for each accident was applied in terms of the results of the hot spot analysis. The 
hot spot analysis produced z-scores on the accidents to decide which belonged to a hot 
spot or cold spot with confidence levels. Thus, a different weight was applied to each 
accident using its respective z-score. For instance, accidents with z-scores greater than 
2.54 were given the highest weight (7) since the points were regarded as hot spots at a 
99% confidence level. Accidents with z-scores larger than 1.96 and smaller than 2.54 
were given the second highest weight (6) since the points were identified as hot spots at a 
95% confidence level. In a similar manner, hot spot accidents with a 90% confidence 
level were weighed at 5. Statistically not significant accidents, meaning they are not in 
hot spots or cold spots, were designated as 4 in weight. Cold spot accidents with a 90% 
confidence level were assigned a 3 in weight since the chance of having high severity 
clustered accidents is lowered as the confidence level increases in cold spots. Thus, 
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accidents having 95% and 99% levels of confidence for cold spots became 2 and 1 for the 
weight respectively. Table 7 shows the accident weight classifications in terms of z-
scores and confidence levels. GIS calculates the point density map using the weights 
specified with z-scores in the Hot Spot Analysis. That is, the point density is formed with 
the number of points as well as the weight of each point. The weight here is z-scores and 
confidence levels. The higher the possibility of being a hot spot, the heavier the weight is 
for each accident point. 
Table 7 Accident Weigh Classifications 
Class Z-score range Confidence level Weights 
Hot Spot 
z ≥ 2.54 99% 7 
1.96 ≤ z < 2.54 95% 6 
1.645 ≤ z < 1.96 90% 5 
Insignificant -1.645 < z < 1.645 Not Significant 4 
Cold Spot 
-1.96 < z ≤ -1.645 90% 3 
-2.54 < z ≤ -1.96 95% 2 
z ≤ -2.54 99% 1 
 
Figure 14 shows the Kernel Density map in the center of Lancaster County. The 
search radius for Kernel Density was set to 1804.46 feet (550 meters) because the 
distance was found in the multiple trials of Global Moran’s I to be the maximum spatial 
autocorrelation among points. Smoothly tapered surface areas were developed to each 
point and the density value of the surface areas decreases when the distance increases 
from the point. In the density map, the identified hot spots were appropriately reflected 
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by considering z-scores as weights. Despite the significant number of low severity 
accidents clustered in the downtown area, the map with weights produced a balanced 
density map by focusing more on hot spots, or aggregated severe truck accidents. This 
was because the density map used not only the number of points, but also the weights for 
the z-scores. 
 
Figure 14 Kernel Density Map in the Center of Lancaster County 
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4.2 Multi-criteria Analysis 
Compared to selecting a risk-prone area with only one criterion, analyses considering 
diverse criteria may produce a more accurate and reliable result. In this research, several 
different layers, such as AADT; wind speed; the locations of hazmat facilities, fire 
stations, medical facilities and schools; heavy vehicle accident density; and population 
density were integrated and scrutinized to locate areas most susceptible to a hazmat 
accident. 
In order for the different input layers to be integrated into one result layer, all the 
input layers were converted into raster format. That is, each layer was defined as a space 
where equally-sized cells are posed in a grid structure form of rows and columns. Figure 
15 shows a common 10 × 10 raster structure. 
 
Figure 15 Raster Data Structure 
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Since each cell in a raster has its own value, more than two raster datasets can be 
combined by adding, averaging, or using other techniques for these values, creating a 
resulting raster form where the values in the cells are arranged according to the operation 
used on the integrated layers. However, when considering more than two layers together, 
the numbering system from input layers may be different. For instance, in this research, 
the wind speed map had a numbering system for speed (m/s or ft/s) while the population 
density was measured using housing units (number of houses). The range value for each 
different input raster layer must be identical, which can be achieved by reclassifying each 
raster datum. Once the range values for different layers are comparable, the layers can be 
combined by adding or averaging the cells based on geographic overlap. Figure 16 shows 
the simple averaging combination process of two different layers. By averaging the 
values in the cells, the most suitable area in terms of different criteria can be detected. 
 
Figure 16 Averaging two Different Layers 
 
When joining different raster datasets, it may be that one raster data is deemed more 
important than another. That is, input layers may be considered with different risk 
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significance. For instance, in this research, roadway segments that have higher AADT 
should be considered more vulnerable than those having lower AADT. Thus, different 
weighting schemes should be applied for different raster layers. Figure 17 shows an 
example applied with weights (30 percent for layer A and 70 percent for layer B). In such 
a case, layer B is considered more significant and the resulting layer shows different 
arrangement of cell values compared to the one in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 17 Combining Two Different Layers with Weighing  
 
 
Using the weighted overlay function in ArcGIS, different datasets can be integrated 
with weighted values. The system indicates the calculated cell values in a different color 
scheme to show where high or low values are for appropriateness of a given study area. 
The technique was considered useful to deal with multi-criteria problems. In this 
research, different properties of the diverse data obtained to identify vulnerable areas in 
terms of a potential hazmat truck accident were investigated with this technique. Figure 
18 represents the flowchart of the multi-criteria analysis. 
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Figure 18 Flowchart of Multi-Criteria Analysis 
 
4.2.1 Data Preparation 
The data were obtained from diverse sources and explained in section 5.1. The raw 
data of the locations for fire stations, medical facilities, hazmat facilities, and schools 
were available in an Excel spread sheet containing information on coordinates of those 
facilities. These facilities were geocoded and created in the Shapefile format in GIS with 
visual representations on a map. The road network was classified into three different 
groups representing different AADT (0~15,000; 15,001~30,000; and 30,001 or more). 
This is because AADT was considered an indicator of the degree of potential danger for 
hazmat truck accidents. Thus, the three roadway groups with different AADT were 
Data 
Preparation 
•Collecting Required Data 
•Formatting Data  
Environment 
Setting 
•Selecting a proper projection 
•Setting a processing boundary 
Deriving 
Datasets 
•Deriving distance from the road network according to AADT 
•Deriving distance from the schools, fire stations, Hazmat and medical facilities 
•Deriving proper values from Wind power class Truck accident density and Population Density map 
Reclassifying 
Datasets 
•Assigning identically classified range values to datasets                                                                                               
(Assigning 1 to 30: 30 to the most vulnerable places and 1 to the least vulnerable places) 
Weighted 
Overlaying 
•Weighted overlaying all the inputs with given percentage 
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loaded in three layers. Also, wind speed, population, and truck accident density layers 
were added in GIS. The truck accident density layer was the output of accident data 
analysis explained in the section 4.1. Finally, all the layers were clipped to fit to the 
Lancaster County area only. That is, in using the Lancaster County layer, all the areas 
beyond the County boundary were excluded in this analysis. 
4.2.2 Environment Setting 
Before the analysis, a map projection and a calculation processing extent needed to 
be set in ArcGIS. The map projection transforms the curved surface of Earth to a flat 
surface. In the course of this process, some distortion is inevitable since the flat surface 
cannot perfectly mirror the spherical surfaces of Earth. There are many projections 
available that have their own mathematical transformation processes to convert the 
Earth’s surface into a map on a flat piece of paper by preserving information such as 
distance, area, or direction. This research used the Equidistant Conic method, which is a 
projection method by which distances among features along the meridians are preserved 
proportionately. Application of the Equidistant Conic projection method helped produce 
more appropriate results since this research was mostly based on the distances among and 
from point data. Also, an output processing extent was also set that allowed calculation 
processes in ArcGIS to continue until the set boundaries were reached. The analysis 
boundary was defined to be the study area as Lancaster County. 
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4.2.3 Deriving Raster Datasets 
The feature class datasets such as polygon, line, or point must be converted into the 
raster datasets in multi-criteria analysis. The data for the location of fire stations, schools, 
hazmat facilities, and medical centers were converted into the raster data format using the 
Euclidean distance tool. This calculates distances from the features and assigns 
corresponding values to the cells in a raster data form. For example, when the locations 
of hazmat facilities were considered, the raster cell values decrease as the distance from 
each facility increases in straight lines. In a similar way, line feature class datasets for 
roadway groups with different AADT were converted into the raster data form. The 
distance was calculated from each line feature and cell values were arranged with the 
distance.  
The polygon feature class datasets, such as population density and wind speed class, 
already had assigned values in each polygon feature across the map. Thus, these datasets 
were converted into the cell-based raster format by maintaining the values. Since a cell 
may include more than one polygon feature value, it is required to manage how the cells 
will be assigned with multiple feature values included in one cell. Three different 
methods exist to determine polygon values in a cell-based raster format. The first method 
is to use the cell center with which GIS assigns a value in a cell for the raster form by 
considering where the center of the cell is located. If the center meets with a certain 
polygon feature value, the value becomes the cell value. The second method is to use the 
maximum area included in a specified cell. In a cell, the biggest polygon area and its 
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value represent the cell. The last method is to use the maximum combined area where cell 
values are determined with the combined majority polygon features within the cells. This 
method is distinguished from the maximum area method because it determines one 
majority area by aggregating homogeneous fragmented polygons within a cell. Figure 19 
shows the illustration of how the cell value is determined with multiple polygon feature 
values assigned in one cell. 
     
Figure 19 Illustration of an assigned value in a cell in raster datasets 
 
 
 With the datasets used in this analysis, all three methods produced a fairly similar 
result. This is because the specified cell size in this research was significantly small and 
this small cell size formed a considerably detailed resolution across the study area. Thus, 
the result of three were the almost same and the cell center method and its result map 
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were used for the analysis. Meanwhile, the truck accident density map obtained in the 
accident data analysis was originally produced in a raster data format. Thus, it did not 
require the transformation and was used directly. Figure 20 shows all the derived raster 
datasets. 
 
Figure 20 Derived Datasets 
 (1:  Roadway segment AADT (0 to 15000), 2: Roadway segment AADT (15001 to 
30000), 3: Roadway segment AADT (30001 or more), 4: Medical Facilities, 5: Fire 
Stations, 6: Schools, 7: Hazmat facilities, 8: Population Density (Housing Units), 9: Wind 
Speed Class Map, 10: Truck Accident Density) 
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4.2.4 Reclassifying Datasets 
To integrate different raster datasets into a single dataset, all the input rasters needed 
to be set in a common range scale. Since the datasets derived from the previous step had 
their own values in different measurement units, all the input datasets were reclassified 
from 1 being the least vulnerable to 30 being the most vulnerable in terms of hazmat 
release accidents on roads. That is, the surfaces on input raster datasets were equally 
divided into 30 different segments. Each segment represents a different risk level. Figure 
21 shows the reclassified datasets.  
 
Figure 21 Reclassified Datasets 
(1:  Roadway segment AADT (0 to 15000), 2: Roadway segment AADT (15001 to 
30000), 3: Roadway segment AADT (30001 or more), 4: Medical Facilities, 5: Fire 
Stations, 6: School, 7: Hazmat facilities, 8: Population Density (Housing Units), 9: Wind 
Speed Class Map, 10: Truck Accident Density) 
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4.2.5 Weighting and Combining 
To obtain the integrated result raster layer, the reclassified datasets were overlaid in 
GIS to find the most vulnerable place. When combining the datasets, it is realistic to 
assign a different weight to each raster dataset according to the relative importance of the 
layer. In this analysis, equal weights were assigned except for the roadway groups that 
had different AADT. Table 8 shows the weighting scheme applied for this analysis. 
Table 8: Percentages of Influence for Each Raster Datum 
Raster Datasets Influence (%) 
Roadways 
AADT(0 to 15,000) 5 
AADT(15,000 to 30,000) 10 
AADT(30,000 or more) 15 
Hazmat Facilities 10 
Medical Centers 10 
Fire Stations 10 
Schools 10 
Wind Speed 10 
Truck Accident Density 10 
Housing Unit 10 
 
Except in the case of roadway groups, 10% of weight was used for all other raster 
datasets. In this analysis, the weighting scheme applying different weights on the 
different raster layers was not used due to the lack of information and literatures which 
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specify relative importance among different raster layers. Instead, this research more 
focused on developing procedures to be applied later with different analysts who use their 
own local factors determining relative importance of input layers. All things considered, 
the final result map is shown in Figure 22. The darker shaded areas were more vulnerable 
to hazmat accidents.  
 
Figure 22 Integrated Result Raster Layer for Hazmat Truck Accidents 
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4.2.6 Identifying Risk-Prone Roadway Segments 
The integrated result map from multi-criteria analysis was used to identify risk-prone 
routes in Lancaster County. The weighted value range was between 9 and 20, and the top 
two tiers (19 and 20) were considered to be the first prioritized risky areas with respect to 
hazmat truck accidents. Figure 23 shows the highlighted top two tiers. That is, if the 
routes are near those highlighted yellow areas, they are considered high-risk with respect 
to the hazmat truck accidents. 
 
Figure 23 Highlighted Top Two Tiers in MCA 
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A 300-ft wide buffer was created for each highlighted area to select nearby risk-
prone routes. The buffers for these areas also combined tiny fragmented roadway 
segments in reasonable length. Figure 24 shows the selected routes. The routes were 
overlapped with the risk-prone areas. 
 
Figure 24 Identified Vulnerable Routes in Lancaster County 
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4.3 Impact Analysis 
With the identified vulnerable roadway segments, impact analysis was conducted to 
estimate the affected areas and quantify the population vulnerable to potential hazmat 
truck accidents. The analysis was explained with a theoretical scenario where a truck 
trailer carrying chlorine had overturned on a risk-prone route identified by the multi-
criteria analysis. Using hazmat release pattern modeling software called Areal Locations 
of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA), diffusing patterns of hazamt from the accident 
point were portrayed. With the specified disperse patterns and distances of the hazmat 
release, generalized affected areas were estimated, and housing units within the identified 
patterns were considered as affected population. 
4.3.1 Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) 
ALOHA is computer software that models hazardous material release patterns. It 
was developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 
the US EPA, and is distributed by the National Safety Council (NSC). This program has 
been used as an emergency response tool for hazmat release accidents because it can 
predict the air dispersion of toxic materials. Once several factors about the hazmat 
accident are determined, the program delineates atmospheric conditions from toxic 
source materials based on the user-specified Level of Concern (LOC). LOC in this 
research is a critical level of toxicity set to create different threat zones. The software 
allows setting three LOCs and estimates threat zone boundaries accordingly. Emergency 
56 
 
 
 
Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) were used for the toxic LOCs for chlorine, so the 
three defined LOCs were 20 ppm, 3 ppm and 1 ppm, respectively, in chemical 
concentration. That means the program calculated the different toxic zone boundaries 
according to the chemical concentration value. 
The derived atmospheric patterns for hazmat release were utilized to estimate and 
quantify the affected areas and population in Lancaster County. Figure 25 shows an 
example of the model estimation for a chlorine release accident with three different threat 
zones based on the specified levels of toxicity. The smallest ellipse is the zone where the 
chemical is highly concentrated. Larger ellipses indicated lower concentrations of 
toxicity levels due to wind dispersal. The software considers statistical uncertainties 
about wind direction. The areas drawn with lines beyond the shaded areas are probable 
threat zones at a 95% confidence level according to wind direction uncertainty. This 
means that the model results have a range of variability. As an example scenario with 
several assumptions, a plausible hazmat release pattern is estimated in the following 
section. 
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Figure 25 ALOHA Model Prediction in Lancaster County with Three different Threat 
Zones 
 
4.3.2 A Virtual Scenario for ALOHA Modeling 
A virtual scenario for a hazmat release accident was used to model an example case, 
and it reads as follows: On July 19, 2014, at 10:03 a.m. local time, a truck trailer carrying 
chlorine was overturned on the Interstate Highway 80 near Superior Street in Lancaster 
County. The truck had a horizontal cylinder tank whose diameter was 4 feet and length 
was 36 feet. It included 3,046 gallons of chlorine liquid (90% of a full tank). When trying 
to avoid a sedan changing lanes, the truck overturned and the tank developed a hole 
resulting in about 17% of the liquid chlorine leaking on to the paved roadway and 
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gasified into surroundings. The leak was about a 2-inch circular hole, situated 3.3 feet 
from the concrete bottom. The outside temperature at the site was 75°F, and the wind 
speed was 6.15 miles per hour (measured at 160.04 feet from the ground) from northwest. 
It was partly cloudy and about 75% humidity. The terrain on the site was open without 
any buildings. 
To model the hazmat release accident, several input data were required in the 
program including crash site data, chemical data, atmospheric conditions, and chemical 
source data. First, the information on the location, date, time, and surrounding 
environment of the accident point were input. Second, the chemical type was chosen 
from the provided library function in the program. Third, atmospheric conditions such as 
wind speed and direction, air temperature, cloud cover, and humidity were selected. 
Finally, chemical source information on tank size, tank types, stored chemical 
temperature, and types of leaking were included. Table 9 shows the input data for 
ALOHA modeling. 
Table 9 ALOHA Model Input Data 
Description Input types Input  
Site-specific data 
Location Lincoln, Nebraska 
Time July 19, 2014, at 10:03 a.m. local time 
Chemical data Chemical name Chlorine 
Atmospheric 
conditions 
Wind 
6.15 miles per hour from NW at 164.04 
feet 
Ground roughness Open country 
Cloud cover Partly cloudy 
Air temperature 75°F 
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Relative humidity 75% 
Chemical source 
Tank diameter 4 feet 
Tank length 36 feet 
Liquid volume 3,046 gallons (90% of full tank) 
State of the 
chemical 
Liquid inside the tank/Gas outside 
Stored temperature -30°F 
Opening type Circular opening with 2 inch diameter 
Released quantity 17% of 3,046 gallons 
 
Figure 26 shows the estimated footprints, or toxic threat zones, for the hazmat release 
accident according to ERPG (20ppm, 3ppm, and 1ppm for chlorine). To be specific, the 
smallest areas within the red line had a chlorine concentration greater than 20 ppm. The 
next larger areas within the yellow line had a chlorine concentration greater than 3 ppm 
but less than 20 ppm. Finally, the areas within the black line represented a chemical 
concentration greater than 1 ppm but less than 3 ppm. The detailed ALOHA result 
summary table can be found in Appendix C. 
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Figure 26 ALOHA Modeling for Virtual Scenario 
 
To estimate the affected areas, the footprint was loaded in GIS using ALOHA’s 
ArcMap import tool with appropriate coordinates. The affected areas for the chlorine 
release accident were portrayed from the accident spot in Lancaster County as shown in 
Figure 27. The calculated threat zone distances for the three chemical concentration 
levels were 0.9, 1.9, and 2.8 miles respectively.  
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Figure 27 Chlorine Release Accident Dispersion Pattern in Lancaster County 
 
4.3.3 Estimation of Affected Area 
One of the common methods to estimate the affected area is to use a band of fixed 
width on a link. Calculating the number of people residing inside of the area produces the 
link consequence. The main assumption of this method is that people living inside of the 
band will be impacted equally and no one outside of the band will be impacted. However, 
it does not consider wind speed and direction of chemical dispersion. One circle cannot 
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mirror different impact levels, which are based on the concentration level of toxic 
substances. Also, when the wind is blowing, chemical substances move and affect areas 
further downwind while upwind areas have less or no impact. That is, an impact analysis 
with circular areas may produce erroneous prediction results. Therefore, it is important to 
differentiate the consequences at different distances by applying concentration levels. 
Using ALOHA software, it was possible to use a dispersion model to estimate the 
concentration levels at different distances from a pollution source. It predicted three 
different threat zones from the most concentrated chemical area to the least concentrated 
area, considering the site specific data, chemical information, atmospheric conditions, 
source data, and other important characteristics.  
To quantify the area, the estimated model in ALOHA was projected onto an aerial 
photo in ArcGIS, and the actual affected areas within the dispersion model were 
considered as affected areas. Since the model included statistical uncertainty about wind 
direction, both actual affected areas and total possible affected areas at a 95% confidence 
level were calculated. Table 10 shows the areas measured in acres. Dispersion of 
chemical on larger area resulted in reduced chemical concentration. However, the 
affected area size increased drastically as the chemical concentration attenuated from the 
source point. 
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Table 10 Measured Areas for Chlorine Dispersion Accident 
Statistical Occurrence 
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) for 
Chlorine Concentration 
ERPG-3 (20 ppm) ERPG-2 (3 ppm) ERPG-1 (1 ppm) 
Actual Affected Areas  
(Shaded areas) 
127.27 446.95 900.39 
Total Possible Affected 
Areas at 95% 
Confidence (Dashed 
areas) 
562.72 2295.48 4935.67 
Note: the unit of area is the acre. 
 
4.3.4 Estimation of Affected Population 
From the possible hazmat release plumes portrayed in GIS, people affected by the 
accident were estimated using 2010 population data for Lancaster County. The data were 
obtained from the US Census Bureau and included population and housing units by 
census block groups. All of the block groups within the identified hazmat release plumes 
were considered, and the number of people and the housing units within the blocks were 
counted to estimate the affected population. When selecting affected blocks, blocks 
within the boundaries for hazmat plumes were included. However, for the blocks that 
were partially included within the boundary lines, a logical way was required to decide 
whether the block should be included. Since the population data were recorded by 
polygon-shaped census blocks while the hazmat release boundaries were curved lines, 
these two different shapes inevitably caused erroneous results when estimating the 
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affected population. Thus, in this research the centroid concept was used to decide 
whether the block should be counted or not. If the block centroid was inside the cutoff 
line, it was included for the calculation of the affected population. This method was used 
because selecting block groups only within the boundary lines resulted in significant 
underestimation of the affected population. In other words, block groups whose areas 
were mostly included in the hazmat release boundaries would have been excluded if the 
centroid method had not been used. Even though this method overestimated the affected 
population, it was not as significant as the problem of underestimation when only 
considering blocks that were totally included. Table 11 presents the affected populations 
in different chlorine concentration levels. Since patterns of hazmat release accidents were 
fan-shaped, the affected populations increased as the distance from the source increased. 
Table 11 Affected Populations in Different Chlorine Concentration Levels 
Affected populations 
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) for 
Chlorine Concentration 
ERPG-3: 20 ppm ERPG-2: 3 ppm ERPG-1: 1 ppm 
Number of People 1,355 (4,267) 3,181 (15,015) 4,475 (24,509) 
Housing Units 659 (1,934) 1,525 (6,281) 1,998 (8,569) 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis represent total possible affected population at a 95% 
confidence level about wind variability. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
Through the research work, the proposed methods found solutions about problems of 
the previous research work. Many researchers have tried to conduct operation research 
for hazmat transportation problems to provide optimized routes. However, most of them 
gave much attention to local routing problems in the given network. Even, the operation 
research did only consider limited factors such as travel time or cost in multi-criteria 
analysis. The raster analysis technique proposed in this thesis allows considering 
numerous factors together in cell-based raster formats. This area-based identification tool 
can also be applicable to broad areas. 
In the previous research, hazmat transport prediction models were mostly applied for 
a single mode of transportation. Even though some researches had investigated hazmat 
routing methods to apply for all transportation modes, the procedures became complex 
and included intricate equations. In this proposed GIS-based hazmat transportation risk 
identification method, different modes of transportation such as rail, pipeline or even 
water transportation could be easily integrated and analyzed together within a specified 
study area due to the map-based GIS integration techniques.  
The proposed methods developed an effective tool to deal with hazmat transportation 
route risk assessment. However, the analysis process also leaves some possible 
limitations behind to be dealt. When weighting and combining different raster layers in 
the multi-criteria analysis process, some factors may not change the results while others 
may change the result significantly due to their different sensitivity to the result. For 
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instance, it is probable that the locations of fire stations or schools may not be 
significantly influential to the result because they are evenly spaced across the study area. 
On the other hand, locations of hazmat facilities would affect the result more since they 
are likely to be located in a certain area for safety purposes. Thus, establishing a 
sophisticated weighting scheme is required to produce a more accurate result.  
In addition, input layers identified for inclusion in the analysis could be based on 
some objective indices such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
requirements. In this research, eight possible different datasets were considered, but there 
may be some other variables which can also be included. A list of critical facilities 
provided by U.S. Department of Health Human Services (DHHS) could be used to find 
all possible variables being included for the analysis.  
Finally, in the hot spot analysis, the straight lines among accident points were used to 
calculate the spatial relationship. However, it is more accurate to use network-based lines 
since the accident points are inter-related along the roadway network. In addition, these 
straight lines do not consider the 3-Dimenssional features such as interchanges, bridges, 
or tunnels. Since the accident points were geocoded with only x and y coordinates, the 
third factor, or height could be used to identify the spatial relationship among accidents 
more accurately.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS  
Modern industrial processes require hazardous materials and their transportation 
across highways carries a certain amount of risk to those living in relative proximity of 
those highways. Assessment of routes that pose the highest risk from transportation of 
hazardous materials is needed for more informed planning and response. There have been 
studies dealing with identifying optimized hazmat routes and estimation of affected areas 
using diverse models. However, the direct identification of vulnerable areas with respect 
to hazmat releases from truck accidents has not been fully researched. In addition, a 
simplified combination of quantitative risk analysis using historical accident data and the 
multi-criteria analysis has not been fully exploited. 
In this research three main analyses were conducted. First, historical truck accident 
data were analyzed with spatial statistical concepts. Instead of creating accident density 
maps directly, a spatial data analytical technique called hot spot analysis using the Getis-
Ord Gi* statistic was used to determine where the high or low severity accidents were 
clustered. The accident density map reflected the accident severity levels. That is, high 
severity accidents were weighted more based on density. The density map provided not 
only where the accidents were clustered but also where the high or low severity accidents 
were clustered. The locations of the clusters were considered to be more vulnerable areas 
in terms of hazmat transportation. This density map then became one of the inputs for 
multi-criteria analysis where diverse criteria were transformed into raster layers. Through 
the analysis, it was found that the high severity accidents were more clustered near the 
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intersections and interchanges on major highways while low severity accidents were 
clustered in downtown area where the roadway network is complex with low speed limits. 
Second, all the inputs to identify vulnerable areas were analyzed in GIS through 
multi-criteria analysis. The raster analysis technique using small cells was used to discern 
cell-based vulnerable areas in terms of hazmat transportation release accidents. By all the 
cell values in the input raster datasets, the integrated result raster provided vulnerable 
areas in Lancaster County. These areas were then used to select the potential risky routes 
for the potential hazmat truck accidents. That is the routes that were overlapped with the 
identified vulnerable areas were found and designated to be potential risky routes in 
terms of hazmat truck accidents. This area-based identification tool for potential risk-
prone routes for hazmat release accidents also allows analysts to consider multimodal 
hazmat transportation.  
Finally, impact analysis identified hazmat release patterns and their consequences by 
calculating the affected areas and population. In this analysis chlorine was used for the 
calculation of the release pattern in a theoretical accident. ALOHA modeling software for 
hazmat was used to produce the hazmat footprint via a virtual scenario. When compared 
to the previous methodology using a simple circle to estimate the affected area and 
population, the proposed method using ALOHA effectively quantified the more 
reasonable affected areas and vulnerable population by considering wind, terrain and 
chemical source information. The result created three different hazmat concentration 
zones according to Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG). Also, possible 
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variation zones with statistical uncertainty for wind direction at a 95% confidence level 
were also estimated. The created different distances can be used for the hazmat 
evacuation distance planning by quantifying the affected population and areas.  
Even though the presented procedure in this research provides an effective tool to 
identify the potential risky roadway segments and the affected areas and population for 
hazmat evacuation plans, there are future research topics to be explored. The applied 
weights for each criterion layer in the multi-criteria analysis may be modified for 
different regions where the analysis is conducted. Thus, a universal application process to 
apply the concept to other areas could be researched henceforward. That is, the weight for 
each input datum could be area-based to accurately mirror reality by creating local factors. 
Also, the input system for real-time data should be deployed to establish an immediate 
evacuation planning tool. In particular, integration of the input system for varying traffic 
and weather conditions would provide real-time evacuation planning process to local 
governments when hazmat truck incident occur in the area. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) in Lancaster County   
 
 
Facility Name Address Zip Latitude Longitude 
LINCOLN ELECTRIC SYSTEM 
TERRY BUNDY GENERATING 
STATION 
7707 BLUFF RD 68517 40.9097 -96.6128 
PARKER HANNIFIN CORP 252 N 134TH ST 68520 40.814167 -96.538333 
KAWASAKI MOTORS 
MANUFACTURING CORP USA 
6600 NW 27TH ST 68524 40.877992 -96.758428 
NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER 
DISTRICT SHELDON STATION 
4500 W PELLA RD 68368 40.55202 -96.7829 
LAND O'LAKES PURINA FEED LLC 
- LINCOLN 
5500 N COTNER 
BLVD 
68507 40.868222 -96.618468 
TELEDYNE ISCO A BUSINESS UNIT 
OF TELEDYNE INSTRUMENTS INC 
4700 SUPERIOR ST 68504 40.857354 -96.655028 
VEYANCE TECHNOLOGIES INC 4021 N 56TH ST 68504 40.853264 -96.644184 
MOLEX INC 700 KINGBIRD RD 68521 40.852101 -96.738394 
LESTER ELECTRICAL 625 W A ST 68522 40.799069 -96.728859 
LINCOLN INDUSTRIES INC 600 W E ST 68522 40.803125 -96.728391 
ADM 7800 THAYER ST 68507 40.866447 -96.620111 
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PFIZER INC 
601 W 
CORNHUSKER 
HWY 
68521 40.835588 -96.728228 
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA 
1717 CENTERPARK 
RD 
68512 40.765942 -96.697879 
TRI-CON INDUSTRIES LTD 4000 NW 44TH ST 68524 40.854167 -96.781111 
ADM MILLING 540 S ST 68502 40.791582 -96.714309 
CLEAVER-BROOKS INC 
6940 
CORNHUSKER 
HWY 
68507 40.869427 -96.626847 
YANKEE HILL BRICK 
MANUFACTURING CO 
3705 S 
CODDINGTON 
AVE 
68522 40.777 -96.7495 
BEDIENT PIPE ORGAN CO 
1060 SALTILLIO 
RD 
68430 40.697222 -96.705278 
MOLEX INC 1400 W BOND CIR 68521 40.844323 -96.740403 
STANLEY SENIOR TECHNOLOGIES 1620 N 20TH CIR 68503 40.829167 -96.691944 
FARMLAND FOODS INC (COOK'S 
HAM) 
200 S 2ND ST 68508 40.8125 -96.7169 
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Appendix B Result of Incremental Spatial Autocorrelation in 30 different distance bands 
 
 
OBJECTID Distance(m) Distance(feet) MoransI ExpectedI Variance z_score p_value 
1 100 328.084 0.011177 -0.002061856 0.000739 0.487011 0.62625 
2 150 492.126 0.01562 -0.001733102 0.000778 0.622033 0.53392 
3 200 656.168 0.02531 -0.001618123 0.000741 0.989382 0.322476 
4 250 820.21 0.033482 -0.001485884 0.000745 1.281044 0.200178 
5 300 984.252 0.018936 -0.00140056 0.000705 0.765929 0.443719 
6 350 1148.294 0.053556 -0.001328021 0.000702 2.071437 0.038318 
7 400 1312.336 0.057057 -0.001270648 0.000668 2.257363 0.023985 
8 450 1476.378 0.063886 -0.001240695 0.000618 2.618806 0.008824 
9 500 1640.42 0.060688 -0.001216545 0.000567 2.599235 0.009343 
10 550 1804.462 0.062848 -0.001201923 0.000522 2.804334 0.005042 
11 600 1968.504 0.056293 -0.001180638 0.000496 2.579562 0.009893 
12 650 2132.546 0.051912 -0.001173709 0.000449 2.506454 0.012195 
13 700 2296.588 0.052179 -0.00116144 0.000411 2.632039 0.008487 
14 750 2460.63 0.045733 -0.001152074 0.000382 2.399401 0.016422 
15 800 2624.672 0.042579 -0.001146789 0.000349 2.340353 0.019266 
16 850 2788.714 0.035722 -0.001142857 0.000317 2.071476 0.038314 
17 900 2952.756 0.029185 -0.001141553 0.000287 1.789503 0.073534 
18 950 3116.798 0.024577 -0.001140251 0.000266 1.576795 0.114843 
19 1000 3280.84 0.019808 -0.001136364 0.000254 1.313059 0.189163 
20 1050 3444.882 0.020209 -0.001135074 0.00023 1.406692 0.159519 
21 1100 3608.924 0.016898 -0.001135074 0.000216 1.225808 0.220271 
22 1150 3772.966 0.016212 -0.001133787 0.000205 1.210382 0.226133 
23 1200 3937.008 0.012177 -0.001132503 0.000196 0.951204 0.341501 
24 1250 4101.05 0.016614 -0.001128668 0.00019 1.285979 0.19845 
25 1300 4265.092 0.014729 -0.001128668 0.000182 1.175892 0.239638 
26 1350 4429.134 0.016648 -0.001127396 0.000173 1.351216 0.176626 
27 1400 4593.176 0.014115 -0.001126126 0.000165 1.185792 0.235705 
28 1450 4757.218 0.016186 -0.001126126 0.000155 1.389855 0.164573 
29 1500 4921.26 0.01774 -0.001124859 0.000149 1.543679 0.122666 
30 1550 5085.302 0.018386 -0.001124859 0.000142 1.636035 0.101832 
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Appendix C ALOHA Text Summary 
 
SITE DATA: 
   Location: LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 
   Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.47 (user specified) 
   Time: July 19, 2014  1003 hours CDT (user specified) 
 
 CHEMICAL DATA: 
   Chemical Name: CHLORINE                Molecular Weight: 70.91 g/mol 
   AEGL-1 (60 min): 0.5 ppm   AEGL-2 (60 min): 2 ppm   AEGL-3 (60 min): 20 ppm 
   IDLH: 10 ppm 
   Ambient Boiling Point: -30.9?F 
   Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm 
   Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% 
 
 ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)  
   Wind: 6.15 miles/hour from NW at 164.04 feet 
   Ground Roughness: open country         Cloud Cover: 5 tenths 
   Air Temperature: 75?F                 Stability Class: B 
   No Inversion Height                    Relative Humidity: 75% 
 
 SOURCE STRENGTH: 
   Leak from hole in horizontal cylindrical tank  
   Non-flammable chemical is escaping from tank 
   Tank Diameter: 4 feet                  Tank Length: 36 feet 
   Tank Volume: 3,384 gallons 
   Tank contains liquid                   Internal Temperature: -30?F 
   Chemical Mass in Tank: 39,642 pounds 
   Tank is 90% full 
   Circular Opening Diameter: 2 inches 
   Opening is 40 inches from tank bottom 
   Release Duration: 16 minutes 
   Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 569 pounds/min 
      (Averaged over a minute or more)  
   Total Amount Released: 1,321 pounds 
   Note: The chemical escaped as a mixture of gas and aerosol (two phase flow). 
 
 THREAT ZONE:  
   Model Run: Heavy Gas  
   Red   : 1599 yards --- (20 ppm = ERPG-3) 
   Orange: 1.9 miles --- (3 ppm = ERPG-2) 
   Yellow: 2.8 miles --- (1 ppm = ERPG-1) 
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